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Radicalism, Counter-Radicalism and 
the American Legion, 1919–1940
George Lewis*
Abstract
The means by which the United States sought to identify radicals and 
radicalism in the inter-war years has been largely hidden by a scholarship 
that has, instead, chosen to focus on processes of Americanization. By 
analysing hitherto hidden and underused archival sources, this essay 
examines the ways in which the American Legion positioned itself to 
become the single most important lobbying force in the identification 
of inter-war radicalism in the USA, used its considerable resources 
to sustain a vigorous programme to identify radicalism which served 
its own organizational interests, and, therefore, had a significant and 
meaningful impact on debates over radicalism and Americanism at local, 
state and national levels. The Legion reacted to a changing climate which 
saw radicalism identified first as an external, immigrant-led threat in the 
early 1920s, and then as an internal, home-grown menace as the 1930s 
drew on. That saw the organization grapple with questions including 
the innate intelligence of immigrants, as debates raged over whether 
radicals were lured unwittingly into that radicalism or chose radicalism 
because of a fiendish acumen. Throughout the period, the Legion’s view 
of radicalism was deeply subjective, but was disseminated – and all too 
regularly accepted – with a polished veneer of objectivity that belied the 
often vituperative national debates that surrounded ideas of radicalism.
In 1919, the United States Bureau of Education’s Director of 
Americanization, Fred Clayton Butler, attempted to navigate through 
terrain that had been rendered unrecognizable by the First World War 
and its immediate aftermath. His most pressing concern remained 
the processes of Americanization that had begun in earnest in 
the United States at the start of the decade, but which had been 
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significantly complicated by a number of wartime imperatives relating 
to immigration. In terms of national identities, for example, Butler 
acknowledged that his fellow countrymen had fostered a ‘righteous 
hatred of Germany’s barbarism’ during that wartime moment, but that 
the Founding Fathers of the United States had ‘wisely decreed that the 
gates of America shall be open to all’, or at the least, in the careful codicil 
that Butler was minded to add, to all those ‘who meet certain reasonable 
requirements’, whether wartime foe or not. In so doing, Butler was 
reflecting contemporary debates over the nature of the United States 
and its ideology of Americanism, and the extent to which the civic 
nationalism championed by Theodore Roosevelt had been compromised 
by the direct experience of the war. For followers of the former President, 
all Europeans met Butler’s ‘reasonable requirements’ and were therefore 
capable of Americanization, a view that necessitated a clear distinction 
to be made between the particular wartime behaviour of Germans, 
on the one hand, and what was contemporaneously described as the 
inherent German national character, on the other.
For a growing cadre of racial nationalists who sought to base 
immigration and naturalization policies on a hierarchy of racial and 
ethnic groups which included the establishment of difference between 
Europeans, the issue was no simpler: the Germans who had been the 
nation’s wartime enemy were nonetheless held to be ‘superior’ to the 
Catholics, Jews and Eastern Europeans who were increasingly classed as 
incapable of successful Americanization. In the context of those battles 
between Roosevelt’s civil nationalism and the predominantly nativist-
inspired racial nationalism that challenged it, a shared intolerance of 
political radicalism appeared to provide some welcome unifying ground. 
Here, too, however, Butler faced increasing concerns as he sought to 
deal with the challenge presented not by the geographical origin of 
immigrants themselves, but by many of the social, political and economic 
forces that had coalesced into the United States’ first major Red Scare, 
which, beginning in 1919, witnessed an increasingly nativist constitu-
ency mount a series of counter-attacks against what was perceived to 
be a hydra of multi-headed radicalism, led by communists, syndicalists, 
anarchists and radical socialists. Despite Butler’s office being ultimately 
answerable to the Department of the Interior, the national mood increas-
ingly identified threats to Americanization as having their genesis in 
exterior forces, not least because the majority of those radical groups’ 
adherents were first-generation, foreign-born immigrants.1
It was largely as a result of those mounting pressures that 
Butler produced a series of federal government handbooks that were 
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specifically designed to aid both state and local programmes in their 
attempts to ‘Americanize’ the nation. Butler and his Bureau acknowl-
edged that education technically remained the devolved responsibility 
of the individual states of the union, but believed nonetheless that the 
federal government should retain a commitment to helping individual 
states to Americanize any recent immigrants living within their borders. 
Such a view has led some historians to characterize the period as one 
in which the federal government maintained a defence of the nation’s 
external borders, while those individual states protected against a 
perceived enemy within.2 Indeed, in Butler’s words his purpose was 
to provide ‘some concrete suggestions of ways by which the States 
may serve effectively in the education and the assimilation into full 
fellowship and citizenship of our foreign-born people’.3 Where the 
historiography has begun to examine the processes by which the First 
World War complicated ideas and ideals of that citizenship, it has yet 
to identify the full range of processes by which the United States sought 
to isolate and identify radicals and radicalism. That process was far 
more complex than a simple binary sum that posited all those who 
were denied citizenship as automatic radicals. If, as recent scholarship 
has ably shown, there were parallel narratives that led different 
groups, such as Native Americans, pacifists and proponents of women’s 
suffrage, into different levels of citizenship’s embrace, so, too, were 
there divergent pathways to being identified as radical.4
The ongoing contemporary debates over immigration, which 
were fought largely between Rooseveltian civic nationalists and the 
growing band of nativist-inspired racial nationalists who sought tighter 
restrictions on immigration policies, found more common ground over 
the question of political radicalism. To many, the proponents of the 
1919 Red Scare were bound by two common features: their ideological 
and political radicalism, which was often depicted as a disease; and 
their immigrant status as non-native born aliens, which, in popular 
discourse, often led to their being depicted as particularly susceptible 
to that disease of radicalism. A greater point of division came in the 
question of how to identify those radicals, and what to do with them 
once that identification had taken place. Where Butler wrote in broad 
terms of the process of Americanizing ‘our foreign-born people’, others 
drew firmer distinctions between future American citizens capable of 
undergoing Americanization successfully, and carriers of the radical 
disease who were not and who were, therefore, un-American. For 
those racial nationalists who sought to differentiate between different 
peoples on the basis of their physical characteristics, one of the greatest 
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dangers posed by un-American radicals was their seeming anonymity. 
This was a metaphysical intellectual disease that they were carrying, 
not one resplendent with external physical symptoms. As one scholar of 
totalitarianism has aptly commented, these leftist radicals of the 1920s 
were particularly dangerous because, unlike the brash visibility of their 
far-right, fascist counterparts in the 1930s, they remained a largely 
hidden threat.5
Evidence from another of the Bureau of Education’s published 
handbooks, however, suggests that it may in fact have been possible to 
identify such radicalism after all, for in his work Butler had stumbled – 
perhaps unwittingly – upon what might be termed the aesthetics of 
Americanism. The publication included an image of an Armenian 
immigrant who, after years in the United States, had been effectively 
Americanized, a process that had bestowed him with a ‘confident 
look of self-reliance, of optimism, of determination, of prosperity, of 
equality’. Importantly, each of those characteristics had surely also 
inoculated him against the ‘hopeless, hunted look of fear’ worn by his 
parents, whom he was pictured greeting on an East Coast wharf, fresh 
from their arrival from the Old World (Fig. 1). If Butler and his Bureau 
had required readers to identify the radicals in the image in 1920, it 
would surely not have taken long to pinpoint the dishevelled, non-
Americanized parents as carriers of the radical disease, so clearly did 
they reflect so many of the tropes associated with immigrant radicalism 
by those intent upon prosecuting the Red Scare.6
Given that Butler considered the fight against radicalism and 
for the preservation of Americanism to be the preserve of the federal 
government, or at the very least one that should be devolved to 
individual state governments, it is likely that he would not have 
anticipated that some of the most formidable praise for his pioneering 
handbook work came from a non-governmental organization, the 
American Legion. A self-proclaimed ‘patriotic organization’ that was 
newly formed in the wake of the First World War, the Legion’s foun-
dational intention was to keep ‘the spirit’ of American patriotism 
that was fostered among US servicemen in that conflict ‘alive’ in 
peacetime. As the Legion began to organize itself in the domestic 
confusion that followed the return to peacetime, both its size and its 
original remit started to evolve organically. By the end of 1919, its 
first year in operation, it boasted over one million members; by the 
time of its fourth annual conference, held in New Orleans in 1922, 
it was no longer following the narrow confines of a responsibility to 
protect those servicemen, their conditions and their rights. Instead, it 
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embraced a much fuller, national campaign of Americanization. As it 
did so, it became clear that the organization’s title was to refer as much 
to ideological Americanization as to mere geographical location. For 
Legionnaires, that meant the creation and dissemination of an active, 
aggressive programme of Americanization, but also a concomitant 
drive against radical un-Americanism.7 The peculiar circumstances in 
which it found itself granted the organization a particularly privileged 
position. As has been argued elsewhere, the post-war period saw the 
reintroduction of a traditional ‘suspicion of state power’ among the 
citizenry after a period of obeisance during the war, when war-duration 
legislation had given the federal government untypical powers to 
enforce Americanization under the aegis of promoting loyalty. Once that 
legislation had expired and those suspicions had returned, however, the 
federal government was forced to withdraw from a strong, disciplinary 
Americanization programme. The Legion was perfectly suited to fill that 
void and to act as an alternative instrument of state power.8
The attention to detail and vigour that the Legion brought to bear 
on its work with veterans’ affairs quickly informed its Americanization 
Figure 1 Source: Butler, Community Americanization, plate 1.
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work. Indeed, such was the force of Legion campaigning, and so great was 
the reach of its organizational strength and membership, that it became 
the single most important lobbying force in inter-war American anti-
radicalism. In terms of policy and politics, for example, the Legion had 
an impact at local, state and national levels, not least because many of 
those in prominent positions of law enforcement and policy making were 
themselves Legionnaires. These included Congressman Albert Johnson 
who helped to enshrine the Legion’s policy of restricted immigration 
by constructing what became the Johnson–Reed Immigration Act of 
1924, and Hamilton Fish III, who chaired a congressional anti-radical 
investigatory committee that bore his name a decade after drafting the 
Legion’s preamble.9 The weight that the Legion brought to those efforts 
therefore exposes both a considerable irony and a false dichotomy. In 
terms of the former, historians have long recognized that the limited 
yet vocal group of US Congressmen who opposed tighter immigration 
restrictions in the 1920s often pointed to the loyal service and martial 
sacrifice rendered by immigrants during the World War as part of their 
defence of the idea of immigrant loyalty. Here, though, was the largest 
and, by 1924, most comprehensively developed organization of those 
veterans lobbying extensively for, and even drafting, exclusionary 
legislation. In terms of the latter, the extent to which the organiza-
tion’s membership encompassed individuals working at local, state and 
federal leadership levels shows that arguments which seek to separate 
the federal oversight of external borders from state oversight of internal 
subversion neglect the extent to which the Legion bridged what is, in 
this context, an often artificial divide.10
In order to ensure the successful dissemination of such a wide-
ranging message, the Legion constructed a framework of considerable 
reach: attempts at high-brow critiques of immigrant radicalism in the 
American Legion Monthly magazine, which included a four-part series 
of essays on radicalism, were bathetically combined with the National 
Americanism Commission’s The Huddle, a hastily assembled broadsheet 
that sought to explain most of the Legion’s work through tortuously long 
sporting metaphors, but which nevertheless went out to the organiza-
tion’s 10,000 posts, plus a further 6,400 posts belonging to its Women’s 
Auxiliary.11 In terms of taking its message to the masses, the Legion 
organized a Junior Baseball World Series – both because baseball 
represented a metaphor for Americanism and because it inculcated 
players with ethics that stood them in good stead against radicalism – 
and a schools’ essay competition, which was routinely based around an 
anti-radical or anti-subversive annual theme.12
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Despite the active efforts and capital that the Legion poured into 
its anti-radical and Americanization campaigns, the extent to which 
that activity had a material effect on the nation’s conceptualization 
of radicalism in the inter-war period, and its resultant central role in 
identifying and combating US radicals in the inter-war period, has not 
received the historical analysis that its impact has deserved. The Legion 
was, as one study has acknowledged, ‘one of the most powerful interest 
groups’ of that period which, though ‘rarely studied’, nonetheless ‘had 
a dramatic influence’ on the twentieth-century United States. Part of 
the explanation for the difference between the weight of its apparent 
influence and the paucity of detailed historiographical analyses of its 
role lies in the available source base, for the organization’s archives 
remain private, some of its materials were purposefully destroyed at 
the end of the twentieth century, and access to scholars is carefully 
controlled. There are, however, other less prosaic reasons. The sheer 
scale of the membership and range of Legion activities, for example, 
has made it difficult to compress its activities into workable single 
volumes: the one academic monograph to concentrate on the organi-
zation had to limit its focus to one particular period, 1919–1941, but 
was nonetheless still unable to cover all of its work in depth, and, for 
example, did not make use of the Americanism Commission’s regularly 
issued newsletter in its analysis.13 The result is that the Legion 
inhabits a peculiar space in the existing historiography, as it is often 
cited as an exemplar of particular forms of behaviour or ideological 
approach in passing, but is rarely probed in depth. Some scholars, 
for example, remain content to side-line the organization as one 
that provided little more than rhetorical bluster and strike-breaking 
manpower. Elsewhere, while the historiography has in recent years 
shifted away from the original idea that the anti-radicalism of the 
First Red Scare was driven by ‘fear’ to offer an altogether more sophis-
ticated and wide-ranging analysis, texts on the subject of post-war 
Americanization continue to overlook the Legion’s work on radicalism 
and anti- radicalism, and often fail to move beyond the passage of the 
Johnson Reed Immigration Act of 1924 to view the inter-war period as 
a whole.14
Where, in contrast, the Legion has been studied, the precise focus 
of that work remains perplexing, whether in terms of its analytical 
framework or its chronological span. In terms of the former, for 
example, a socio-political analysis that concentrates on the Legion’s 
early leadership and its attempt to position the group as one that battled 
over the idea of class itself, rather than between different classes, does 
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offer interesting insights into the organization’s development more 
broadly, but they are liminal when compared to analyses of how or 
why the organization developed or maintained particular strategies, 
especially in terms of its anti-radical campaigns. The Legion did not, 
as that analysis would have it, simply ‘battle’ against ‘progressives 
and radicals’ during the inter-war period as a patriotic organization; 
rather, it was instrumental to national and federal efforts to define 
those groups. Finally, in terms of chronological approach, existing 
work that does seek to concentrate on the role of the Legion as an anti-
radical force has not taken as its focus the 1920s and 1930s when its 
programmes were first launched and expounded, but rather the 1940s 
and 1950s, during which the ‘Contact Program’ saw explicit links being 
built between the Legion and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 
as the Bureau was forced to rely on a network of conservative groups to 
‘monitor dissent and ensure internal order’.15 The collective result has 
been not just a failure to comprehend the full impact of the Legion’s 
role in the inter-war years, but also, more importantly, a misunder-
standing of the overall interplay between American radicalism and anti- 
radicalism in the 1920s and 1930s.
The Legion brought its many resources to bear in a sustained and 
vigorous post-war programme of first identifying and then countering 
what it defined as radicalism. In terms of its vigour, that programme 
cast it as an inheritor of the Rooseveltian tradition of enforced, discipli-
narian Americanization; in terms of its focus on restricting particular 
immigrant groups, it was squarely within the racial nationalist camp. 
In a pronounced period of activity, the Legion utilized two separate 
strategies in two distinct phases. In terms of the first phase, which 
ran from the end of the War until the end of the 1920s, the 
Legion drew upon Butler’s approach and tied radicalism inextri-
cably to alien-born immigrants, with the result that it endeavoured 
either to excise the problem altogether by halting immigration at 
source, or to alter that problem fundamentally by seeking to immerse 
immigrants immediately into a comprehensive educative programme of 
Americanization. The Legion’s early 1920s attempts to bar immigration 
were based on core assumptions that were, at first glance, confusing 
and even paradoxical, for the organization’s literature often portrayed 
racial characteristics as heritable and immutable – which was why 
the influx of Eastern European immigrants was such a worry, for they 
were believed to be particularly susceptible to radical ideologies – yet 
there was also a fundamental faith in the melting pot theory, upon 
which the educative side of the Legion’s programme was premised. 
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The Legion would not have expended vast swathes of organizational 
capital on education if it were believed that those who were being 
educated could never fall into Americanism’s protective embrace. 
Drawing upon the contemporary metaphor of radicalism as a disease, 
the Legion therefore navigated a pathway that effectively bridged 
what scholars have traditionally seen as two separate traditions. 
It held that the inoculating effect of Americanism was sufficiently 
strong to overcome any heritable disposition towards the diseases of 
radicalism.
Such was the speed with which the Legion developed its anti-
radical mechanisms, and so swift was its accumulation of organizational 
capital, that, only two years after its inception, National Commander 
F.W. Galbraith, Jr. argued that its educational programme could 
effectively crush the threat that the Legion believed was then posed to 
the United States by radicals, and that as a result ‘at the end of twenty 
years we will have a race of almost one hundred per cent. Americans’. 
The main threat to that success, he argued, came from the activities 
of a previous wave of radicalized arrivals, who preyed upon the lack 
of many immigrants’ English, and who lurked at the Port of New York 
dockside or Pennsylvania Station ready to greet those with whom they 
shared a mother tongue. Galbraith claimed, 
I can prove to you that within three days from the time of the 
people coming over from Russia and Poland and some of the 
countries that are more or less radical, that within three days 
those people are in a radical hall and are being taught that, 
‘the thing that you are here for is to make a new government, a 
free government; that you may take what is yours by right’.16
The insinuation from Galbraith was that many immigrants were 
lured into radicalism through an ignorance of what, ideologically, 
Americanism represented, and by a radical presence which, in turn, 
was not wholly American. As an article in the American Legion Weekly 
magazine argued in 1922, even those first-generation immigrants ‘who 
have settled in the country and got the name of being “good Americans” 
are capable of reverting to their earlier allegiance. At best, they know 
little of the struggles and ideals of the Republic they have joined.’17 
Wherever it was viewed, the problem of radicalism was an external 
infection. Garland W. Powell, chairman of the Legion’s National 
Americanism Commission, explained the point in Service: For God and 
Country, a text book that he designed primarily for America’s school 
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children. On breaking into the secret headquarters of any radical, he 
noted, the opening of closets 
reveals stack on stack of printed propaganda, printed in almost 
every tongue. A fertile field in which to plant this propaganda is 
in the mind of the person who cannot read or write our language. 
He can be taught only in his own language and the revolutionary 
propagandist knows this, seizes upon it and works it for all it is 
worth.18 
The Legion thus set about countering what it identified as that 
radical propaganda with its own publications, workshops and educative 
programmes on what can only be described as an industrial scale.
Of course, the Legion recognized that it would be far easier 
to educate newly arrived immigrants into Americanism’s anti-radical 
embrace if there were, simply, fewer of them. Thus, Legionnaires used 
their considerable lobbying prowess to push for the passage of restrictive 
immigration legislation. As the title of a 1919 article on the melting pot’s 
failure that was disseminated to all Legion posts put it, ‘What Cannot Be 
Fused Must Be Refused’, followed by a text which specifically endorsed 
the plans that Legionnaire and Congressman Albert Johnson was 
already beginning to draw up to stem the radical tide through restrictive 
immigration legislation. Again, it is a sign of the swiftness with which 
the Legion was able to expand its organizational capacity that, when 
legislation was finally signed into law with the passage of two acts specif-
ically designed to decrease the percentage of immigrants arriving from 
what were perceived to be the radicalized hotbeds of Old World Eastern 
Europe, the Immigration Restriction Act of 1921 and the Johnson–Reed 
Act of 1924, the Legion’s input into their successful enactment was 
tangible and meaningful.19 As a fully paid-up Legionnaire, Johnson had 
not only been in attendance at the organization’s National Convention 
during which a resolution was passed to ‘fully endorse the restrictive 
features’ of his proposed Johnson–Reed Act, but was also there as a 
member of the convention’s Americanism Committee. The convention’s 
Legislative Committee, moreover, had, according to Powell, ‘already 
presented bills to Congress carrying out the spirit of those resolutions’.20 
Johnson was at the heart of federal anti-immigrant policy making in 
Washington; he was equally positioned within the Legion.21
By the end of the first decade of the inter-war period, however, 
the Legion’s view of radicalism had altered subtly yet significantly, 
signalling its second anti-radical stage. Exemplifying the extent to which 
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American radicalism must be fully contextualized to be understood, a 
number of factors combined to undermine the existing conception 
that the United States was in imminent, life-threatening danger from 
a disease of radicalism that was borne on the backs of foreign-born 
immigrant aliens: first, the Red Scare of the immediate post-war period 
passed without the much mooted collapse of American democratic 
society; and, secondly, it was clear that the net immigration rate, 
which had been in slow decline for decades, had stalled significantly 
on account of both greater legislative restrictions on alien arrivals and 
fewer economic opportunities in the era of Depression.22 For some, 
those changes have been understood within the context of a longer and 
broader political debate, which pitted ‘disciplinarians’ against more 
progressive forces. The former, it has been argued, envisioned a discipli-
narian state which would enforce Americanization coercively, but found 
that a number of their mooted programmes were dissipated or ‘blocked’ 
by opposition from progressive forces. As a result, they turned their 
focus to immigration restriction as an alternative means of reaching 
many of the same ends.23 The Legion formed a signal part of those 
disciplinary forces, but also showed that another route was available. 
For, when those changing immigration patterns left the Legion’s central 
premise looking structurally implausible, it did not end its anti-radical 
programme, but rather contributed to a shift in its work against – and 
perception of – radicalism.
In overall terms, where the Legion had initially viewed American 
radicalism as the product of an alien, uneducated ignorance, the 
organization began to acknowledge the role of intelligence in an 
American-born radicalism. The threat was now from within, and, what 
is more, was increasingly depicted as being borne not by the unintel-
ligent but rather by those with fiendish acumen: it was that intelligence 
which allowed them to inculcate their way undetected into the fabric 
of America’s most central institutions, from where they would bore 
from within. Although it was never articulated as such, changes in 
immigration and radicalism appeared to have identified an internal 
flaw in the logic of enforced Americanization and the ideology, as then 
understood, of Americanism. Even within Roosevelt’s embrace of the 
melting pot theory, he and his supporters had maintained that, in the 
words of the American Legion Monthly article, that which could not 
be ‘fused’ into Americanism had to be ‘refused’, and that a number of 
immigrant groups simply did not have the heritable intellectual capacity 
to become full Americans, which, in turn, rendered them a threat to the 
fabric of society. Here, though, came acknowledgement that radicals 
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could be Americans by birth, and therefore full US citizens. The Legion 
was now fundamentally altering the intellectual assumptions that 
underpinned the process of radicalism’s identification. A generational 
shift had taken place. Where Theodore Roosevelt had long held the 
superiority of ‘Americans’ to be inherent, and political radicalism to 
be an intolerable trait of certain non-American immigrant groups, the 
greatest threat of radicalism was now seen to come not from external 
non-Americans but internal un-Americans.
As one member of the Americanism Commission explained to 
what he referred to as his ‘comrades’ in the Legion, the issue of 
denouncing radicalism by the end of the 1920s had become far more 
difficult than it had been in the relatively simplistic immediate post-war 
era. ‘Now our problem is much more insidious,’ he noted, ‘because the 
sponsors of it are not uneducated foreigners from across the sea, but 
those people among the most educated but distorted minds among 
our own people.’ A jump had been made ‘from the ignorant’ and the 
‘uneducated’ to ‘the best trained minds that our country offers’.24 What 
was more, those minds worked ‘Guised under the cloak of religion and 
education’, from where they were ‘unusually active in our educational 
institutions and churches. The masses have been misled,’ the Legion 
claimed, ‘with their purported facts and figures.’25 The ‘most telling 
influences’ of the ‘agitprop’ of radical communism were now ‘those of 
which we are unconscious,’ the Legion reported, and now that ‘the last 
rebel [in the Soviet Union] had been shot or silenced’, Stalin had the 
time to oversee developments in other countries. For radicals, the most 
useful and fearsome ‘red’ was now ‘a good fellow who adroitly fans 
any spark of disaffection and insubordination in others. That is, he is 
not himself a trouble-maker but encourages others to make trouble.’26 
To return to Butler’s image aestheticizing Americanization (Fig. 1), 
the radical was now far more likely to be the dapper, well-dressed 
and seemingly affluent gentleman on the left than the two archetypal 
Eastern European peasants on the right.
The clearest iteration of this new view of American radicalism 
came in one of the defining documents of the 1930s anti-radical 
crusade, the American Legion’s 207-page ISM’S. Finally published by 
the organization’s National Americanism Commission in 1936, after 
what prior ideological predilections would interpret as either years of 
painstaking research or hours of cutting and pasting from other existing 
sources, ISM’S became a handbook for this new view of radicalism, 
and, equally, of how best to combat its many strains. Importantly here, 
the most threatening of those ‘isms’ were still perceived to be those of 
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socialism, syndicalism and communism on the left, for the Legion had a 
far more benign view of the fascism that began to bind the far left and 
far right together into a single ‘totalitarianism’. The temptation to view 
the Legion’s less antipathetic view of fascism as a reflection of its own 
militarism should be avoided, however. Since its formation at the end 
of the First World War, it had resolutely opposed any attempt to bask in 
what others saw as the heroic glories of martial endeavour. If it were to 
have viewed the relative threats of fascism and communism in militaristic 
terms, the Legion would have likened the threat from fascism to that of a 
frontal assault which, through its obvious visibility, could be combatted 
appropriately. The threat of communism, in contrast, would have been 
akin to an unseen ambush from perfect cover. In terms of its overall 
strategic direction, ISM’S made it clear that education was still key, 
and the Legion remained committed to the idea that its own networks 
provided a source for the most efficacious way of delivering that anti-
radical education. ‘It is believed,’ wrote ISM’S editor and National 
Americanism Commission Assistant Director, Homer L. Chaillaux, 
that the greatest need at this particular time is the enlightenment 
of all of our people to the menace of Communism. American 
citizens must be informed of the many ways in which the 
Communistic movement bores from within. They must know of 
the many subsidiary and co-operating organizations and of their 
activities. That is the purpose of this book.27
Importantly, the Legion’s view of radicalism was deeply subjective, 
but was disseminated – and all too regularly accepted – with a polished 
veneer of objectivity that belied the often vituperative debates that 
surrounded ideas of radicalism, both within the organization and more 
broadly. For the former, Legion posts with dissenting views, such as 
the Corporal Sydney Rosenberg Post in Brooklyn, New York, whose 
largely Jewish membership decried official Legion pronouncements 
on immigration restriction and radicalism, were subsumed by the 
voices of a relatively small band of Legionnaires who regularly took 
advantage of a paucity of attendance at annual conventions to make 
their own voices heard. When such dissent was heard, however, it was 
framed as a microcosm of the national debate between restrictionists, 
who wished to minimize immigration in line with the racial nationalist 
agenda and who made up the vast majority of Congress, and the small 
band of anti-restrictionists who opposed them, not least because those 
anti-restrictionists – just as the Sydney Rosenberg Post did – drew on 
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the loyalty and wartime sacrifice of immigrants to make their case for 
a softer immigration stance.28 The leading figures of the Legion were 
not, however, interested in prolonging such debate. The organization’s 
increasing concentration on what it termed ‘radical pacifism’ sought to 
downplay the significance, and even deny the presence, of oppositional 
views. Those veering from the Legion’s policy line, such as Columbia 
University’s Dr David Muzzey, who publicly argued for ‘America the 
Beautiful’ to replace the overly – and overtly – militaristic ‘Star Spangled 
Banner’ as the national anthem, were sidelined as ‘un-American 
leaders of our youth’, and tainted with guilt-by-association. ‘It will 
be interesting … to make a further analysis of the past history of the 
leaders of the radical pacifistic groups’, wrote National Americanism 
Commissioner Russell Cook, for ‘An investigation will no doubt bring 
out that these people have made no contribution whatsoever to 
America’s forward march and, particularly, to the development of 
a greater love for the nation and for its Flag’.29 With eyes firmly set 
upon the civilizing and deterministic influence of citizenship, National 
Americanism Commission Chairman Paul H. Griffith followed Cook with 
the assertion that such radical pacifist movements have ‘most certainly 
made no contribution to our government or plan of recovery’.30
Indeed, by May 1932, the Legion’s The Huddle publication was 
exhorting Legionnaires to ‘Preach the Doctrine of Americanism’, which 
included the deployment of ‘your every influence to curtail the 
present spread of propaganda and radical activities so evident in our 
country today. I am referring to the professional pacifists, radicals and 
communists’, The Huddle continued, for ‘The national dignity, security 
and character of this nation is being attacked in every possible angle by 
these groups’. In a close alliance with the Communists, those ‘profes-
sional pacifists’ were ‘using every means possible to tear down the 
national defense and confidence of this government’. The Legion’s logic 
was simple: the Soviets had stated their avowed purpose to smash and 
overthrow the capitalistic government of the United States; if armed 
force was to be used in that offensive, how much easier that objective 
would prove to be if the United States was suffering from a lack of 
preparedness. To cap it all, believed the Legion, and further exempli-
fying its preference for limiting the range of totalitarianism to include 
only those ideologies that appeared on the far left of the political 
spectrum, it was simultaneously clear that ‘the mother country of their 
doctrine – Russia – [is] building up a great army and strengthening its 
national defense system’.31 By 1934, the Legion’s annual convention 
had mandated support for a raft of measures designed to counter its 
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own take on subversion, radicalism and the dangers that both were held 
to threaten: the oath supporting the Constitution that several states 
already required of their teachers, for example, was to be mandated 
at the federal level; radical aliens who should be deported, but whose 
deportation was forestalled or postponed by inadequate legislation, 
should be held in ‘Alien Camps’; and the Legion formally opposed 
pending legislation in the form of the Crowe Bill which, in its analysis, 
‘would admit aliens as citizens without obligation to bear arms in 
defense of our Flag, our Constitution and our Country’.32
As with the first stage of the Legion’s campaign against inter-war 
radicalism, so this second stage was as important for the way in 
which the Legion was able to insinuate its views into the fabric of 
federal government policy as it was for the particular way in which 
it chose to define radicalism. Most simply, the Legion managed to 
establish itself as a founding member of what effectively became a 
self-reinforcing vortex of information and ‘expertise’ on radicalism. 
The Legion’s annually updated Americanism Manuals, for example, 
referred to ‘information regarding communist activities’ which was 
taken from a government report derived from ‘the findings of the 
special committee to investigate communist activities in the United 
States’.33 Perhaps even more to the point, a memo sent to the Legion’s 
National Commander, Stephen Chadwick, noted that the official report 
of the Special Committee on Un-American Activities, a congressional 
investigatory committee with the remit of countering ‘un-American 
subversion and propaganda’, contained a ‘definition of Americanism 
as used by that Committee, which you [Chadwick] have used in 
varied forms in your speeches’.34 That was not surprising, given that 
Chadwick had provided it. Appearing before Texas Congressman 
Martin Dies’ investigatory committee into un-American subversion 
only two months previously in a bid to help those congressmen define 
and identify un-American radicalism, Chadwick had read widely from 
ISM’S, donated a copy to the committee’s files, and pledged both his 
and the Legion’s support for the continuation of what was then a 
temporary committee.35
If, as has been argued, that congressional committee represented 
the clearest example of the ‘conservative counterattack’ against the civic 
nationalism of the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration, then the Legion 
was at its very core. Indeed, throughout the later inter-war period, the 
definitions of subversive ‘un-American’ radicalism that those congres-
sional committees formulated drew largely from the ‘expertise’ of the 
Legion and, in particular, its National Americanism Committee. As 
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well as Chadwick’s contribution, for example, National Americanism 
Commission Director Homer L. Chaillaux was invited to appear before 
Dies’ un-Americanism commission on its first day in August 1938, 
Roy P. Monahan appeared under the aegis of both the Legion and 
the Disabled Veterans when the Hearings ventured to New York City 
in September, and Harper L. Knowles and Ray E. Nimmo appeared 
as chair and counsel respectively of the Legion’s ‘radical research 
committee’.36 Knowles’ testimony clearly revealed the chimerical nature 
of the Legion’s professed political bi-partisanship and, simultaneously, 
the Dies Committee’s objectivity. Having already been sued for slander 
and libel by Democratic candidates running in his native California, even 
whilst professing to abide by the Legion’s political neutrality, Knowles 
willingly stood under oath before the Dies Committee in the following 
exchange:
Chairman:  The investigation which the American Legion has 
conducted is absolutely nonpartisan?
Knowles: That is right.
Chairman: The American Legion is not a partisan organization?
Knowles: Not at all.
Chairman:  It is composed of members of every political party, 
except Communists and other radicals?
Knowles: We hope so.
Chairman:  … And your purpose is to render some service to the 
country in exposing un-American activities?
Knowles: That is our intention, sir.
Chairman:  So that there has not been any bias or prejudice, from 
the partisan standpoint, that has entered into the 
preparation of this material?
Knowles: Not at all.37
The lobbying effort to ensure that Legion ideas on, and policies to 
counter, radicalism were replicated in Washington was strengthened 
further by direct campaigns to pass legislation that mirrored policies 
and resolutions adopted by the organization’s National Conventions. 
In that purpose, the Legion was well served by the expansion of its 
influence into a veritable network of individuals who shared their 
law-making responsibilities with their membership of the Legion itself. 
The Legion was particularly well represented in the halls and corridors 
where immigration policies were discussed and introduced: Senator 
Richard Russell, the Chairman of the Senate Immigration Committee, 
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was a Legionnaire, and his fellow Senator – and fellow Legionnaire – 
North Carolina’s Robert Reynolds, introduced a bill in line with the 
Legion’s anti-immigration and anti-radical policies every year from 
1936 to 1940. Alabama’s US Congressman Joe Starnes treble-dipped, 
for he was a Legionnaire, a serving member of the Dies Committee, 
and the sponsor of companion bills to those of Reynolds in the Lower 
House for each of those same years, every one of which complied with 
what Chaillaux referred to as ‘our National Convention resolutions for 
immigration restriction’. Reynolds, he noted, ‘goes all the way with the 
Legion on this question’. When a new proposal to increase the quotas of 
Finnish immigrants and settle them in Alaska was introduced, Reynolds 
was clear about what he needed to do: ‘Please wire me your reaction to 
such proposals’, he besought Chaillaux.38
The active impact that Legionnaires had on immigration and 
anti-radical policy in the last years of the 1930s, in particular, strongly 
suggests that the post-war FBI Contact Program had long-established 
roots, and that provisional links between the Legion and the Bureau 
were tested and inaugurated long before the outbreak of the Second 
World War. The evidence clearly suggests that Bureau of Investigation 
reliance on such ‘conservative activists’ was not, in fact, a discrete 
product of wartime emergency. There was instead a seamless tradition 
of close cooperation between the Legion and the Bureau throughout the 
inter-war period.39 Alabama’s US Congressman Sam Hobs, for example, 
who was a well-known confidant of J. Edgar Hoover, sought to bring 
the nation’s deportation laws more into line with Legion policy, for 
as it stood in the 1930s, ‘A Red citizen of the United States may not 
be deported’, which had not been an issue when most radicals were 
thought to be first-generation alien-born immigrants. The change in the 
status of radicalism throughout the 1930s had led to a subtle shift in 
the dangers of such a deportation policy. As Fredrick Palmer explained 
in the American Legion Monthly, ‘According to the latest Communist 
statement a large majority of their dues-paying members are [now] 
American citizens. Not only are most of the leaders of the Socialists and 
Communists American citizens, but American born.’40 Hobs therefore 
proposed a bill to detain ‘aliens, communists, Fascists and others’, and 
when he did so he tellingly telegraphed Legion HQ in Indianapolis with 
urgency, noting that he ‘would greatly appreciate’ the endorsement 
of the Legion’s National Convention, in the understanding that such a 
development would give his bill clear impetus. After amendments, Joe 
Starnes and a colleague from Louisiana agreed to support Hobs’ bill, 
but – crucially – only ‘provided the legion [sic] will go along with us’.41 
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Such a view must have informed the desire to involve the Legion with 
the FBI’s networks to combat internal subversion.
Over the course of the inter-war period, then, the loudest and 
most insistent voice in the discourse surrounding both the identification 
and the subsequent means to combat American radicalism belonged 
to the American Legion. Importantly, rather than acknowledging 
itself to be but a single voice in a wider conversation on the means of 
protecting Americanism from a variety of radical threats, and, indeed, 
of identifying the type of radicalism that was most likely to pose those 
threats, the Legion sought to present its subjective take on the issues 
as an objective truth. It neither acknowledged dissenting voices within 
its own ranks, nor listened meaningfully to other organizations and 
individuals who wished to posit a different view from its own. In part, it 
was able to follow that line because of the number of Legionnaires who 
operated both within Legion ranks and within the legislative branch 
of the federal government, although the sheer scale of the Legion’s 
communications and lobbying structures were also key. The combined 
result placed the Legion at the forefront of the developing campaign 
against radical ‘isms’ in the inter-war period, and brought the organi-
zation significant capital through which it was able to have a material 
effect on the content, nature and tenor of contemporary debates on 
American radicalism. Primarily through the work of the Legion, a major 
shift was engendered which saw radicalism being presented first as an 
external threat borne to the United States on the back of foreign-born 
immigrants, and then increasingly as an internal, indigenous American 
threat. If that new wave of radicals was all the more difficult to identify 
because its members were native born, then the Legion would surely 
have to be yet more alert, and federal government initiatives yet more 
controlling, to offer a substantive counter-movement to its dangers and 
a meaningful bulwark to Americanism’s protection.
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